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Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-
0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 25-02-2015	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 01-10-2014 to 18-03-2015
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Get Flat, or Get Flattened - Adapting to the Forces of Globalization		
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
5b. GRANT NUMBER		
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR Mr. William R. Moore		
5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
5e. TASK NUMBER		
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd Norfolk, VA 23511-1702		
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Not for Commercial Use without the express written permission of the author		
14. ABSTRACT The legacy international order that the United States and its allies have depended upon for security and prosperity is unraveling. Many U.S. adversaries have adapted their forms of nonconventional warfare to leverage the forces of globalization to amplify their power, while simultaneously neutralizing superior U.S. conventional military power. National security processes and U.S. military doctrine remain trapped in a paradigm designed for a bygone era. This thesis asserts two mutually supporting arguments. First, shaping operations in the new normal are as strategically important as winning traditional interstate wars. Second, to enable the joint force to align against the expanding multiplicity of globally dispersed threats it must embrace the power of human networks. This paper proposes establishing Regional Security Networks (RSN) to assist the joint force in adapting to 21 st century security challenges.		
15. SUBJECT TERMS		
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified
17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unlimited		
18. NUMBER OF PAGES		
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON		
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 757-443-6301		

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**NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY JOINT FORCES
STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**



**GET FLAT OR GET FLATTENED: ADAPTING TO THE FORCES OF
GLOBALIZATION**

by

William R. Moore

Department of Defense Civilian

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William R. Moore

Department of Defense Civilian

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.


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
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ABSTRACT

The legacy international order that the United States and its allies have depended upon for security and prosperity is unraveling. Many U.S. adversaries have adapted their forms of nonconventional warfare to leverage the forces of globalization to amplify their power, while simultaneously neutralizing superior U.S. conventional military power. National security processes and U.S. military doctrine remain trapped in a paradigm designed for a bygone era.

This thesis asserts two mutually supporting arguments. First, shaping operations in the new normal are as strategically important as winning traditional interstate wars. Second, to enable the joint force to align against the expanding multiplicity of globally dispersed threats it must embrace the power of human networks. This paper proposes establishing Regional Security Networks (RSN) to assist the joint force in adapting to 21st century security challenges. The RSN facilitates collaboration with a wide range of state and non-state partners to develop holistic solutions for complex challenges that span multiple disciplines and frequently cross borders.

DEDICATION

I am foremost grateful for the enduring support of my lovely wife, Luisa. After many years of long absences during my active duty years, she continues to support long absences from home again in my new role as a DOD civilian. I am forever grateful for her internal strength and enduring love.

I am proud to have had the honor to serve with America's finest warriors, and I am forever bound to my Special Operations brothers who gave their lives in the service of our country. Your memory and legacy will always live on.

De Oppresso Liber

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Rear Admiral Gardner Howe and Col Eugene Becker for providing the opportunity to attend the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).

I will always be grateful for the instruction and professional mentorship provided by the entire JAWS cadre, especially the Seminar 3 cadre: COL Rogers, CAPT Giuliani, and Dr. Pavelec. They are all true professionals dedicated to producing the best possible graduates.

I offer special thanks to my thesis advisors Dr. Bryon Greenwald and Col James Golden; and to my writing advisor Mr. Jeff Turner. They endured multiple rough drafts of my thesis and patiently guided me through the process. I also am indebted to Dr. Greenwald for his insights on military innovation. These insights will enable me effectively assist my organization's innovation efforts when I return.

I will always have fond memories of my fellow students, especially my fellow students in Seminar 3 (The Wolverines). It was truly a joint team, and I enjoyed my time with each of you and learned much from each of you over the past year.

I am forever indebted to the many role models and mentors who have influenced my life and my career. The following list is far from complete. First and foremost is my mother who never gave up faith. Second, my numerous military role models and mentors to include: Col Eugene Becker, MajGen Norm Brozenick, SGM Don Briere, COL Pat Carpenter, LTC Dennis Downey, CW5 Tommy Edinger, CAPT Robert Gusentine, RADM Gardner Howe, MG Mike Jones, COL Bill Kay, SGM John Larson, COL Scott McConnell, CW5 Bill McPherson, MSG John Mims, COL Kirk Nilsson, RADM Sean Pybus, CW3 Ralph Rodd, CSM Mike Sherlock, CSM T.J. Taylor, COL Richard Thomas, LTG Tom Turner, MG Bob Wagner, MG Eric Wendt, and even after several decades I fondly remember SFC John Harris, a Drill Sergeant without peer. They all represent the best of the best.

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1. Introduction

New Approaches for a New World

We have wrestled with how to advance American interests in a world that has changed—a world in which the international architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weight of new threats.¹

The legacy international order that the United States and its allies have depended upon for security and prosperity is unraveling. The end of the Cold War and the accelerating forces of globalization have fundamentally transformed the world politically, economically, and socially. Within 25 years of the Cold War ending, the international order rapidly transitioned from a bipolar order to a unipolar order with the U.S. emerging as the sole superpower. Today, the international order is transitioning again from a unipolar order into a nonpolar order, or more accurately a nonpolar disorder.² In this emerging nonpolar environment, more state and non-state actors have the power and the will to shape the international order, often in ways detrimental to America's interests.³

These challenges confront the joint force with a globalized nonpolar new normal condition. The multiplicity of threat actors that are increasingly interconnected (networked) characterizes the new normal.⁴ They have developed new doctrines that leverage the forces of globalization to engage in a perpetual condition of conflict and war with the U.S. and its allies. These actors are employing a strategy of a thousand cuts to weaken the U.S. gradually over time. Their goal is to marginalize America's ability to

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 7.

² Richard Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance?" *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 3 (May/June 2008): 44-45.

³ Ibid., Nonpolarity reflects an international order where there are many state and non-state power centers that have sufficient influence to shape the international order. This means that nation-states will increasingly share power with non-state actors like supranational organizations such as the UN and EU; subnational entities such as insurgencies, militias, tribes, and civil society organizations; and transnational non-state actors such as terrorist and criminal networks, NGOs, and multinational corporations.

⁴ Robert J. Jackson, *Global Politics in the 21st Century*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 13.

shape the international order. Collectively, these conditions result in growing complexity, greater uncertainty, faster rates of change, and the propensity of local events to cascade rapidly across national borders. The joint force must adapt to this new normal by preparing its forces for new types of security threats and evolving forms of warfare.

This paper asserts two mutually supporting arguments. First, shaping operations in the new normal are as strategically important as winning traditional interstate wars.⁵ Second, to enable the joint force to align against the expanding multiplicity of globally dispersed threats it must embrace the power of human networks. To do this, the Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC) will need to establish Regional Security Networks (RSNs). The RSN is an organizational and operational concept that leverages the power of networking. In the simplest of terms, a network is composed of nodes and linkages (relationships) between those nodes. The RSN nodes ideally will consist of a wide range of partners across different security organizations, agencies, and civil society that are willing to collaborate and act with the joint force to prevent, solve, or mitigate common security challenges.⁶ The RSN methodology emphasizes entrepreneurial thinking, relationships built on trust, leveraging a wide range of experts, learning, adapting, and collaboration over directing. In short, the military must adapt to globalization much like businesses have.

⁵ This paper expands the current definition of Phase 0 (shaping operations) in Joint Pub 5 to address the reality of the new normal. Shaping includes all military activities, unilateral or in conjunction with interagency and other partners, intended to: prevent crises, mitigate or contain security problems, deter adversaries, strengthen relations with traditional and nontraditional partners (e.g., NGOs, civil society, local security forces, and tribes), enable these partners, prepare the environment for follow on missions, and any additional activities that provide the U.S. a decisive advantage relative to its adversaries. These activities can include information gathering, limited combat operations, and offensive cyber operations. Shaping is a continuous activity that continues before, during, and after a crisis.

⁶ The more diverse the members of the RSN (nodes), the more skill sets, authorities, access, area experts, and power for the RSN to influence outcomes the GCCs can leverage.

The business world continues to change structurally, operationally, and culturally in response to globalization. The forces of globalization and new technologies have forced the business world to embrace new paradigms for conducting their operations to remain competitive. Hence, businesses are flatter and increasingly use lateral and vertical collaboration over top-down directive management. In fact, in many cases transformation of business processes is often more important than the product they produce or the services they provide to gain a competitive edge.⁷

The RSN concept will enable GCCs to adapt to globalization in the same manner as businesses have to gain a strategic advantage. RSNs provide a method for GCCs to increase their operational reach, influence, agility and flexibility. The GCCs already have many nodes of the RSN concept in place (forward elements, interagency and host nation partners) linked by formal and informal relationships, but they are not optimized to operate using the RSN methodology.⁸ New business practices are required to integrate these nodes vertically and horizontally, and to establish enduring relationships that build trust over time rather than attempting to surge trust in response to a crisis.

To maximize the impact of the RSN, the joint force will have to overcome several obstacles. These include updating joint doctrine to provide a conceptual framework for planning and conducting shaping operations in the new normal; developing personnel management systems that enable the GCCs to man the RSNs with optimally qualified personnel; and developing an appropriate command, control, communications,

⁷ Samuel J. Palmisano, "The Globally Integrated Enterprise," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (May 2006): 127-136, *Business Source Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed October 6, 2014).

⁸ GCCs nodes are primarily linked vertically (hierarchical) with limited horizontal coordination. The RSN concepts seeks to develop networks where the nodes share information and collaborate both vertically and laterally. See figure 3.

computers, and intelligence (C4I) arrangement within the GCC to maximize shaping operations and provide the unique type of C4I the RSN methodology requires. A starting point for devising options to develop solutions for these challenges is to study the existing Global SOF Network (GSN) and Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF) to garner lessons learned from their efforts.⁹ While these existing networks are too limited in their mission scope to serve as models for the RSN to replicate, their lessons are still applicable to the RSN concept.

Implementing this type of change in the military is not easy. It challenges the military's traditional desire to maintain positive top down control. Professor Williamson Murray, a noted expert in military innovation, emphasizes that military change normally involves a long, complex, and nonlinear process.¹⁰ Successful military innovation normally requires an institutional interest in developing new methods of war, and a concrete problem that is in the military's vital interest to solve.¹¹ Fortunately, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO): Joint Force 2020* provides a concrete and relevant problem for the joint force to solve. This indicates at least top down leadership interest in preparing the joint force for the emerging security environment.

The *CCJO* defines the operational problem as determining how the future joint force, with constrained resources, will protect U.S. national interests against progressively capable and globally dispersed traditional and non-traditional adversaries.¹² It describes the future security environment as complex, uncertain, rapidly changing, and

⁹ U.S. Special Operations Command Pamphlet, *United States Special Operations Command: Forging the Tip of the Spear*, (MacDill, AFB, 2013), 2 and 5-6.

¹⁰ Williamson Murray, "Innovation Past and Present," in Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300-328.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 310.

¹² U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, Joint Publications, (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), 2-3.

increasing in competitiveness and transparency.¹³ Conflicts may arise with both state and non-state actors that are accumulating more and more power and will have access to advanced weapons.¹⁴ In actuality, this describes the current security environment, and these conditions will only become more pronounced over time. The CCJO prescribes *globally integrated operations* as the overarching concept to meet this challenge.¹⁵

This concept requires globally postured joint forces to quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. These networks of forces and partners will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space with significantly greater fluidity than today's Joint Force.¹⁶

If adopted, the RSN concept will assist the joint force in actualizing the globally integrated operations concept by increasing its ability to understand, shape, sense, rapidly combine capabilities, and act in discreet ways by leveraging networks to shape the new normal to advance U.S. interests. When required the RSN will expedite larger scale joint force responses to crises. In short, the RSN is a force multiplier that enables GCCs to collaborate with a wide range of partners to address complex threats.

For example, threat actors such as terrorists, criminals, and states frequently converge to attack U.S. interests. This often blurs the lines between the authorities and capabilities of different agencies, so the standard U.S. method of engaging state-to-state, military-to-military, and law enforcement-to-law enforcement will not work. This stove-piped method cannot resolve the complex security challenges the joint force faces today. The convergence of threats creates a military, law enforcement, and civil society

¹³ Ibid., 3-15.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

challenge. Increasingly all elements of national power and society must work together in ways that make their efforts mutually supporting.

Many security problems, such as the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the rapid expansion of transnational criminal networks, and the spread of Ebola demonstrate that today's security challenges frequently cascade across borders requiring both regional and global responses. This implies that the joint force will need to engage and collaborate with a wider range of actors from diverse fields of expertise and influence in multiple countries to mitigate the negative impact of these security challenges. The RSN concept provides a feasible and effective method for the GCCs to collaborate with a wider range of geographically dispersed partners. In fact, it is difficult to see how the globally integrated operations concept described in the CCJO could work without implementing the RSN concept. Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about the importance of partnerships (networks).

'We're often postured to get to an area quickly, but other organizations usually have much greater knowledge of local needs and have greater capacity to provide necessary aid. In these situations, partnerships are absolutely vital,' Winnefeld explained, citing as an example the U.S. military's role in a whole-of-government U.S. response currently underway in Liberia to help contain the outbreak of Ebola. 'Melding their expertise with our logistics capabilities is a powerful addition to the international response to these types of disasters.'¹⁷

Besides the growing number and diversity of national security threats, the character of warfare is changing. The character of warfare has changed throughout history in response to social, economic, political, and technological changes. Today, globalization is accelerating these changes. This paper will describe the emerging form of

¹⁷ Nick Simeone, "Winnefeld: Military's Public-Private Partnerships Yield Benefits," defense.gov, September 29, 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123291> (accessed February 22, 2015).

warfare as nonconventional warfare. The RSN will provide a proactive and dispersed force posture that can provide GCCs with discreet options for conducting this form of warfare and enabling larger scale joint force responses when required.

The new normal condition is real, not theoretical. This does not mean that interstate war characterized by high intensity combat between conventional forces is a relic of history. Continuity and change walk hand-in-hand. On the one hand, the joint force must prepare for the risk of traditional interstate war against increasingly capable adversaries. On the other hand, shaping in the new normal to prevent wars and counter nonconventional warfare is just as important as warfighting. The GCC's organizational challenge is finding the balance between shaping in the new normal and maintaining warfighting readiness.

Since shaping includes preparing the environment to enable joint force options in the event of a conflict, RSN nodes can provide valuable options for warfighting. These nodes not only provide situational awareness and ground truth that the GCCs need to facilitate planning, but some RSN nodes can extend the GCC's operational reach by applying discreet forms of combat power well outside the GCC's joint operational areas. For example, in the unlikely event that relations between the U.S. and China soured to the point of potential conflict, U.S. Pacific Command could leverage another GCC's RSN SOF nodes to threaten Chinese economic interests in multiple locations. Theoretically, the SOF nodes could have developed surrogate capabilities to expand their combat power. These nodes could pursue a wide range of actions to threaten Chinese interests around the globe, potentially compelling Chinese leaders to negotiate instead of resorting

to war. During shaping operations or war, the RSN is a force multiplier that can create decisive advantages for the GCC.

Some interagency partners may not want to support the RSN concept based on fears it will threaten their parochial interests. Fortunately, the largest U.S. interagency partner, the State Department, recognized the changing environment and endorsed a concept similar to the RSN in its 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR recognizes there are new centers of power, building networks is important, and today's threats and opportunities are increasingly global.¹⁸ The QDDR states,

In an interconnected world, cascading changes can and will amplify the significance of a small initial event. Brief windows of opportunity will arise. New challenges will unfold faster than any system can respond. A multiplicity of actors, networks, and activities in countries will expand and diversify the opportunities for us to work with local partners, effect local change, and confront global challenges. We must be fast acting, innovative and flexible, and we must tailor our responses to the complex, rapidly evolving environments in which we operate.¹⁹

It will always depend on the situation, but GCCs will likely find many supporters in the interagency, partner countries, businesses, and civil society that seek to collaborate on matters of mutual concern. The process of building and expanding the RSNs will not be linear. Over time, as successes add up, the concept will gain acceptance and momentum. Since the GCC builds the RSN incrementally over time, it is not an all or nothing approach. This provides ample space for the joint force to experiment and adapt the RSN based on lessons learned. It is the ability to adapt the concept continuously that is one of its greatest strengths in an era of uncertainty and rapid change. While the joint

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, (Washington DC: 2010), 10.

¹⁹ Ibid., 24.

force cannot eliminate uncertainty, through efforts to gain a deeper understanding of the environment it can discern patterns and trends that will inform how the joint force should adapt to protect U.S. interests. The next chapter explains how the forces of globalization are changing the global security environment.

2. The Unraveling

*Once barriers—which in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of what is possible—are torn down, they are not so easily set up again.*¹ Clausewitz

Commenting on the rise of global instability, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted, “The order established and proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point . . . the concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis.”² Despite its immense wealth, military might, and global influence, the U.S. does not have the power to reverse the unraveling of the legacy international order it has depended upon for its security and prosperity. Instead, working closely with a wide range of partners the U.S. must seek to shape the emerging international order in ways that benefit global security and prosperity. The RSN will be essential to this effort.

If the legacy international order is unraveling, then it is logical that the security paradigms that sustained it also need to change. Many national security experts have warned that our legacy national security system is ill-equipped to meet the security challenges of the future. Most pointedly, twenty-two esteemed national security experts produced the widely read report titled, *Forging a New Shield*. These experts consisted of former ambassadors, flag officers, academics, and a former national security advisor. They unanimously affirmed that the national security of the United States is fundamentally at risk due to a number of new and unpredictable threats that differ

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 717.

² Henry Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger on the Assembly of a New World Order,” *online.wsj.com*, August 29, 2014, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/henry-kissinger-on-the-assembly-of-a-new-world-order-1409328075> (accessed on December 25, 2014).

considerably from the Cold War era.³ Furthermore, the U.S. national security system is increasingly misaligned with the rapidly changing global security environment.⁴

The power shifts amongst state and non-state actors facilitated by globalization have created many new centers of power that contend for influence on the global stage. Of particular importance is the rise of powerful transnational threats. Professor Kimberly Thachuk, a senior analyst focusing on transnational issues for the U.S. intelligence community, believes three major trends amplify the significance of transnational threats. They are globalization, the growing imbalance between stable and unstable states, and a widespread increase in ethnic and religious hatred.⁵

The enduring security threats of terrorism, crime, regional conflicts and infectious diseases take on new meaning in the globalized security environment. Globalization increases the risk of a local threat having global implications that can cascade across multiple systems to include diplomatic, economic, and social systems. On the one hand, these threats present the joint force with a wide range of challenges that are transnational in character. On the other hand, the transnational nature of these threats present opportunities. These threats create common interests among states necessitating regional

³ "Forging a New Shield," American Diplomacy, January 3, 2009.

http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/comm/pnsr_report.html. (accessed January 23, 2015).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Kimberley L. Thachuk, *Transnational Threats Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life*. (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007), 8; The 2014 Fragile State Index report assessed that of the 178 states assessed, 109 were in the very high alert to high warning stages of failing. "Fragile State Index 2014." December 15, 2014, Fund for Peace, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf>. (accessed February 1, 2015); Due to complaints from states previously identified as failed or failing, the Fund for Peace changed the name of the index from failed states to fragile states. They defined a failed state as "one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. Moises Naim, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being In Charge Isn't What It Used to Be*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, Mar 2014), 10.

and global cooperation to mitigate their impact. The RSN will assist the GCCs in facilitating this cooperation at the operational level to shape the new normal environment.

Threats will continue to manifest differently at the local level due to the influence of local factors such as geography and culture, but they will also increasingly link to regional and global issues. The expanding force of interconnectedness enables local threats to cascade across borders and across systems (e.g., political, social, and economic) quickly. The challenge of containing Ebola or ISIS are recent examples of this phenomenon. The joint force must address the threats at the local, regional, and global levels. Military and interagency planners must not only understand the impact of local culture and geography, but also the impact of globalization.

The Forces of Globalization

Globalization describes the greater interconnectedness between states, businesses, organizations, and individuals globally. Advances in transportation technology, transportation infrastructure, and information technology, as well as reduced barriers to trade facilitate this greater connectedness. Collectively, this results in increased capacity to move people, goods, money, and ideas across borders and around the globe at unprecedented speed. It also results in greater interdependence between actors for security and economic interests. Germane to this paper, a state now must depend upon the cooperation of other states to address transnational threats to its security.

The full impact of globalization on the future security environment is unknowable. Professor Robert Jackson, an expert in global politics, is one of many analysts who assert that today's threats leverage the forces of globalization to project

power globally.⁶ Toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, non-state armed groups and states with relatively weak militaries have found ways to use the forces of globalization and advanced technologies to challenge states that are more powerful militarily. Examples include Pakistan's ability to acquire nuclear weapons through links with transnational criminal networks, Iran's ability to deter conventional military action by implying the threat of using its proxy transnational terrorist network Hezbollah to impose costs on those who may attack it, and al-Qaeda's rapid expansion after the attacks of 9/11 using the power of globalized information.

Global security specialist Professor Jack Harmon suggests that while the nation-state still dominates, the forces of globalization have reduced the asymmetry between states and non-state actors.⁷ This point is critical and underappreciated. It implies that non-state actors are not increasingly asymmetric in wielding power, but increasingly symmetric when it comes to wielding the power of violence and information (often synonymous for terrorists). They remain asymmetric in morals, laws, organization, and tactics, but they continue to develop the means to strike militarily powerful states with strategic impact. In part, this particular power shift explains why legacy security paradigms focused on slow and centralized decision making, and fighting conventional wars will not work against this type of threat. Failure to grasp how globalization is changing the international security environment and the character of warfare will put U.S. national security interests at considerable risk.

⁶ Jackson, *Global Politics in the 21st Century*, 12.

⁷ Jack A. Jarmon, *The New Era in U.S. National Security: An Introduction to Emerging Threats and Challenges*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 192.

Globalized Information Power

One must appreciate the relationship between continuity and change to understand the requirement to adapt. The ability to motivate large numbers of people to fight for a cause whether by public oration (Pericles), town crier (Paul Revere), or parliamentary speech (Winston Churchill) has been a historical continuity. The change is the ability to share information instantaneously around the globe in multiple forms, and arguably it is the most powerful force of globalization. The speed and reach of these communications have expanded dramatically with the information revolution, the Internet, and the mobile phone. Now, a violent extremist (e.g., Omar al-Baghdadi) can broadcast his message around the globe in seconds. These messages frequently become memes that individuals identify with, occasionally resulting in self-radicalization.⁸ Networks can form rapidly around the globe without the individuals even having met in person. They simply rally to the idea they identified with online.⁹ The power of information to shape the new normal environment is profound.

Today more people have the means to promote competing narratives using the Internet. The ability for anyone to post a video on YouTube and for the video to go viral around the world within seconds is an example of how the Internet has compressed space and time. It is this globalization of information that blurs the distinction between local and global affairs in the social, political, and economic spheres. Metcalfe's Law states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of users in the

⁸ An idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads from person to person within a culture, and in some cases may create a culture.

⁹ See the article on the I3M (Interest, Identify, Indoctrinate, and Mobilize) model by Jesse Kirkpatrick and Mary Kate Schneider, "I3M: A Short Introduction to a New Model of Insurgent Involvement," *Special Warfare*, (October-December 2013): 23-27.

network. The citation below depicts the massive growth of Internet users, which demonstrates the growing potential to form large networks rapidly, and the ability of individuals to use information to shape the new normal globally.

According to Internet World Stats, there were 361,000,000 Internet users in December 2000, which represented 5.8% of the global population. In June 2014, there were 3,035,000,000 Internet users or 42.3% of the global population. The percentage growth of Internet users from 2000-2014 in Africa was 6,498%, in the Middle East 3,303%, in Asia 1,112%, in Latin America and the Caribbean 1,672%, in Europe 454%, in Oceania/Australia 251%, and in North America 187%.¹⁰

The 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) states “the rapidly accelerating spread of information is challenging the ability of some governments to control their populations and maintain civil order, while at the same time changing how wars are fought and aiding groups in mobilizing and organizing.”¹¹ The ability of non-state actors like al-Qaeda and ISIS to leverage this connectivity significantly increases their relative power on the global stage to compete with state actors and each other. The globalization of information played an essential role in facilitating the rapidly cascading effect of the Arab Spring, and the rapid rise of ISIS. ISIS has leveraged social media (and other means) to recruit over 20,000 foreign fighters.¹² “It is the globalization of perception—the ability of everyone to know what is happening around the world and the increasing tendency to care about it. This is one way the small can fend off the large.”¹³

¹⁰ Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, <http://www.Internetworkstats.com/stats.htm> (accessed February 10, 2015).

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington DC: March 4, 2014), 3.

¹² International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” King’s College London, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriaraq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/> (accessed February 1, 2015); Also see Kirkpatrick and Schneider, “I3M: A Short Introduction to a New Model of Insurgent Involvement,” 23-27.

¹³ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt Eds, *Networks and Netwars the Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 6.

One of the more recent examples of “weaponizing” the Internet is Al Qaeda using it to promote *Operation Hemorrhage* through the release of their online magazine *Inspire*. The strategic logic behind this operation is that like-minded jihadists should launch numerous small scale attacks in order to force the West to spend exorbitant sums of money on additional layers of security.¹⁴ The article describes the theory of attacking U.S. economic interests in sufficient detail to serve as guidance for loosely affiliated members and groups to facilitate swarming attacks. It also provided instructions for making bombs that could be smuggled onto commercial aircraft. The Internet provides an almost unlimited means to proliferate knowledge, idealism, radicalization, and technical know-how globally to anyone with access. RSNs are necessary to facilitate the regional and global collaboration necessary to mitigate this threat.

In addition to using the Internet for informational purposes, actors can conduct cyber-attacks intended to disable or destroy targeted infrastructure from anywhere in the world. If an actor does not have the skills to conduct such an attack, he can outsource them to cyber mercenaries available for hire in the global market. With a growing percentage of America’s critical infrastructure connected to the Internet, it is increasing vulnerable to cyber-attack. Not only can this result in strategic level damage, but it may be impossible to determine who conducted the attack. Drs. Lani Kass and Phillip London, who both have extensive experience providing advice on national security policy issues, wrote, “Perhaps for the first time in history, the ability to inflict damage and cause

¹⁴ Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP releases a ‘special issue’ of Inspire Magazine,” November 23, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/aqap_releases_a_spec.php#ixzz2enMm kE6j (accessed December 30, 2014). Also see the Islamic State’s Online Magazine Dabiq at, The Clarion Project, “The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine,” September 10, 2014, <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq> (accessed February 19, 2015).

strategic dislocation is no longer directly proportional to geographic position, capital investment, superior motivation and training, or technological prowess.”¹⁵ Given the speed, expanse, and potential psychological and physical impact of actions in cyber domain, the RSN will need members that possess sufficient cyber skills to protect their network, and in some cases have the ability to exploit adversary cyber networks.

Additionally, terrorists and criminals increasingly commit cybercrime to generate revenue. Cybercrime is rapidly expanding in practice and scale; current estimates are that cybercrime generates \$375-575 billion annually. This is more than the GDP of many nations, which contributes to the power shift between state and non-state actors.¹⁶

Globalized Markets

Increasingly, national security experts see transnational criminal networks (TCN) as a significant threat to national security and the international order. Just like other businesses, TCNs extend their reach by partnering. They may partner with licit businesses, other illicit networks (such as terrorists), government officials, and state security services. The same forces of globalization that enable businesses to move people, goods, money, and ideas across borders and around the globe at unprecedented speed have exponentially empowered illicit actors to do the same.

TCNs leverage the licit systems that facilitate globalized trade to facilitate their illicit activities. This has resulted in a large and rapidly growing illicit economy that networks of criminals, terrorists, and even states exploit to attack U.S. interests. A

¹⁵ Lani Kass and Phillip London, "Combating Asymmetric Threats: The Interplay of Offense and Defense," *Orbis* 58, no. 2, (Spring 2014): 256.

¹⁶ *Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime: Economic Impact of Cybercrime II*, Center for Strategic and International Studies; McAfee, 2014, <http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf> (accessed on February 7, 2015).

detailed discussion on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is critically important for the joint force to recognize how the illicit economy and transnational crime can empower not only criminals, but also terrorists, and influence the character of warfare in the 21st century.

John Robb, an authority on the changing character of war, believes globalization has fostered the development of a huge criminal economy with a technologically leveraged global supply chain that he compares to Walmart. It can handle everything from human trafficking, to illicit drugs, to pirated goods, arms, and money laundering.¹⁷ The implications to national and international security are significant. From a prosperity perspective, it undermines the legitimate economic systems upon which states and businesses depend. From a security perspective, some illicit networks have accumulated more wealth and power than the state institutions responsible for policing them. This can present an existential risk to the governments of developing nations.

This asymmetric wealth empowers illicit networks to compete with the law enforcement and military organizations fighting them.¹⁸ This puts state and local governments at risk of state-capture, where TCNs run segments of the state government, not so much for political purposes, but to facilitate their business activities. The state capture of Guinea-Bissau by drug traffickers and the capture of local governments within Mexico by various drug cartels are recent examples. These threats will likely continue to

¹⁷ John Robb, *Brave New War: The next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*, (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 5.

¹⁸ David T Johnson, *Fighting Networks with Networks: Partnership and Shared Responsibility on Combating Transnational Crime*, Keynote Address at the Trans-Pacific Symposium on Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks Honolulu, Hawaii, November 10, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/131805.htm> (accessed on November 15, 2014).

gain power relative to the states they threaten, resulting in an increasingly unstable and perilous global security environment.

The growing convergence between transnational criminal networks and terrorist networks and states is troubling. Some criminals have turned to terrorism for political purposes, and terrorists have turned to criminal activity to gain funds to support their terrorist activities.¹⁹ In October 2003, the FBI designated Dawood Ibrahim, the leader of a major TCN based in South Asia, as a terrorist supporter for his role in assisting al-Qaeda by letting them use his smuggling routes, and for his role in assisting other terrorist organizations.²⁰ Now that al-Qaeda has established a South Asia franchise focused on turning India into another Syria, this nexus is especially troubling. Dawood's TCN can facilitate al-Qaeda's activities. In the most dangerous scenario it can trigger a war between Pakistan and India, and both states have nuclear weapons.²¹

Mary Kaldor, Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, discusses how “new wars” result in the emergence of new economic models. “The new wars are globalized wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization

¹⁹ A front company in the U.S. that provided student visas for prostitutes also provided visas to all of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11 hijackers and the trafficking victims shared the same “facilitator.” Louise I. Shelley, “ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Growing Role of Human Trafficking in 21st Century Terrorism,” *The Daily Beast*, December 24, 2014, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/26/isis-boko-haram-and-the-growing-role-of-human-trafficking-in-21st-century-terrorism.html> (accessed December 28, 2014); In November of 2002, the FBI helped halt two major illegal drugs for arms deals. An American and two Pakistanis attempted to trade five metric tons of hashish and 600 kilograms of heroin for four stinger antiaircraft missiles, which they planned to send to al-Qaeda operatives. Thachuk 16, *Transnational Threats Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life*.

²⁰ Dawood frequently used his network to move terrorists and supplies, and his money to facilitate training terrorist operatives to launch attacks. Thachuk, *Transnational Threats Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life*, 200.

²¹ Al-Qaeda announced the formation of its South Asian wing on Sept. 4, 2014 with al-Qaeda's chief Ayman al-Zawahiri promising to spread a holy war across South Asia, home to more than 400 million Muslims. Syed Raza Hassan, “Pakistan arrests suspected South Asian al-Qaeda commander,” Reuters.com, December 12, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-pakistan-militants-idUSKBN0JQ11W20141212> (accessed January 4, 2015).

of the state There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support.”²² Today non-state armed groups generate significant sums of money through criminal activities, external support from other non-state actors, and local predation. Due to vast illicit markets they often have many options and adapt quickly to market conditions to raise money. As an example, ISIS generated millions selling oil on the black market. They expanded into other criminal activities to fund their terrorist activities. They now make millions of dollars selling antiquities, and allegedly are selling harvested organs.

Globalization of Technology

The confluence of technologies, from the Internet to nanotechnology to biotechnology, is making it easier for groups and individuals that share a hatred of the U.S. and the West. It is easier than ever for these networks to organize and acquire lethal technology to conduct acts of terrorism that will have a strategic impact. A number of terrorists in al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have advanced degrees in engineering and the bio-sciences. The ability to produce chemical weapons already exists, and the entry point for producing biological weapons decreases every year. These groups will spread this knowledge to each other and beyond. It is this growing proliferation of knowledge, technology, and the correlated lethality of hatred that may be the biggest long term problem the developed world faces.²³

²² For much of the 20th century the term war-economy generally referred to a system that was centralized, totalizing, and autocratic. To increase efficiency and maximize revenue to pay for the war governments centralized their administrations. The new war-economy is almost the opposite. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 95.

²³ Ibid., 66.

Many authors have discussed the increasing potential of strategic terrorism. Dr. Nathan Myhrvold, a technology expert, makes an interesting point, “Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorism can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nation-state would dare to attempt.”²⁴ He goes on to explain that the costs of nuclear weapons (and their associated components) have dropped drastically, making them affordable to a greater number of states. This is largely due to the efficiencies of globalization. This drives proliferation and increases the risk of a terrorist organization (and more states) procuring a nuclear weapon. However, he points out it is far more likely they will produce biological weapons capable of killing tens of thousands due to the proliferation of the knowledge to do so.

John Robb, in his book *Brave New World*, characterizes warfare today as open source warfare (OSW). He draws parallels between today’s warfare and open source software development. Open source software is freely available for anyone to use, modify, and share. In the same ways, OSW is available to anyone who is interested in both modifying and extending it. This means the tactics, weapons, strategies, target selection, planning methods, and team dynamics are all open to community improvement [via face to face or online collaboration].²⁵ Dr. Damian Grenfell and Professor Paul James, both experts on globalization, support this view, noting that “The present period is characterized by increasing global interchange and technological uniformity resulting in extreme tactical uniformity.”²⁶ Terrorist networks have demonstrated an ability to learn

²⁴ Nathan Myhrvold, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” *PRISM*, (VOL. 4, NO.4 2014): 40.

²⁵ Robb, *Brave New War: The next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*, 116.

²⁶ Damian Grenfell and Paul James, Eds, *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence: Beyond Savage Globalization*, (London: Routledge, 2009), 22.

via the Internet, which increasingly standardizes their use of social media, how they produce and use IEDs, conduct suicide attacks, and conduct military training techniques.

Nonconventional Warfare

Nonconventional warfare (NW) is the dominant form of warfare in the new normal. The current doctrinal terms used to describe warfare are too limited when used singularly. The collective synergy that comes from combining irregular warfare (IW), unconventional warfare (UW) [modified from the joint definition], and net warfare comes closer to describing the reality of warfare today. This paper refers to that combination as NW. Nonconventional warfare is a gestalt intended for this paper only to capture the full spectrum of warfare outside the scope of the conventional warfare aspect of interstate war.²⁷

The concept of NW is especially relevant to this paper, since all state and non-state actors can leverage the forces of globalization to use this form of warfare to counter the U.S. military's conventional strengths. While the *CCJO*, the *QDR*, and the *QDDR* all recognize the emerging character of warfare, the military has been slow to adapt. Traditional views of warfare are challenging to shake, especially when the reality of traditional warfare still coexists with NW. The joint force must appreciate that transnational illicit networks present a strategic level threat to U.S. interests, and they can

²⁷ Nonconventional warfare may combine IW, UW, and net warfare to achieve synergistic effects. According to the DOD dictionary: IW is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s); UW consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area [modification, UW can include the use of proxies that are not part of a resistance or insurgency]. Net warfare (also called netwar) is broadly defined by Professor John Arquilla as an emerging form of warfare that uses information technology to facilitate actors in developing dispersed networks [often globally] of interconnected nodes that can be large or small; tightly or loosely connected to each other; inclusive or exclusive in membership; generally flat relying on local initiative to achieve their objectives. See John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 9.

attack with little to no warning. Kass and London argue the U.S. view of warfare is stuck in an outdated paradigm.

The national security discourse gets mired in contrived dualities: war or peace; offense or defense; action or reaction; preemption or response; foreign or domestic; public or private. The new strategic paradigm requires integrated, holistic, nuanced approaches, accounting for the predominantly hybrid nature of today's challenges.²⁸

NW relies heavily on networks, and unlike combating an adversary's conventional forces, the joint force will not gain a decisive advantage by massing its forces on a particular node in their network. If the joint force masses, then the network disperses. The author of *The Starfish and the Spider*, Ori Brafman, argues that when a state attacks a decentralized organization [network] it tends to become even more open and decentralized [and stronger].²⁹ Brafman provides numerous examples in his book to substantiate his claim.

Professors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, leading experts in netwar, argue in their book *Netwars*, how the Internet has enabled networked forms of organization and associated doctrines and strategies attuned to the information age.³⁰ To fight networked adversaries, the joint force also must form networks that allow it to disperse its

²⁸ The security threats they refer to will transcend borders creating challenges that require regional and global security approaches. Kass and London, "Combating Asymmetric Threats: The Interplay of Offense and Defense," *Orbis* 58, no. 2, (Spring 2014): 264.

²⁹ Recent examples include the elimination of Pablo Escobar in Colombia. His death facilitated the rapid development of a loose network of narco-criminals that increased cocaine production to new levels. They also expanded into markets and branched out into other illicit trafficking activities like human trafficking. In other words, the network is now global and harder to defeat. The loss of al-Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan forced its network to become more open. It rapidly spread throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The U.S. must now lead a global network in an attempt to counter these threats. Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations*, (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 21, 26.

³⁰ The authors explain at great length how networked organizations are often flat versus hierarchical and do not rely on central command. Organizers can create these networks for a specific purpose (a directed network), or they can emerge spontaneously. The forces of globalization are what enable this. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt Eds, *Networks and Netwars the Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, Santa Monica, CA: (RAND, 2001), 6.

capabilities to achieve a position of continuing decisive advantage over its networked opponents. The RSN is a perfect fit for countering and waging this form of warfare.

It is not just non-state actors that seek to leverage netwar concepts. Russia, Iran, China, and other states are also studying the impact of globalization and how it may impact future wars. The following quote from two Chinese officers may not represent official Chinese policy, but in the author's view it describes the reality of warfare today.

This kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere [global]. It means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military [involves more than military means], will be totally destroyed, and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and even that the rules of war may need to be rewritten.³¹

How states will employ the forces of globalization and netwar concepts is a topic worthy of additional study. U.S. military doctrine does not address this topic, so the U.S. military will find itself at a comparative disadvantage with states that conduct networked forms of nonconventional warfare. Useful topics of study include Iran's use of nonconventional warfare and its extensive use of netwar concepts. Chinese activities in Africa and South America are worthy of study also.³² These activities may be part of a sophisticated strategy to shape the environment in a way that deliberately puts the U.S. at a disadvantage.

³¹ Liang Quia and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare = Chao Xian Zhan*. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information, 2000), 12.

³² Read Doug Farah's study on the collusion of China, Venezuela, Iran, terrorists, and narcotics networks in Latin America to gain an appreciation of nonconventional warfare. Douglas Farah. *Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-one National Security Priority*. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012).

Summary

General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, “Everywhere, individuals have more access to power than ever before—large hierarchical organizations are losing out to newer, better-networked actors.”³³ It is increasingly apparent that systemic changes created by the forces of globalization have created new security dilemmas; for which the legacy military force is not prepared. While the Westphalian model will likely continue to exist, globalization has facilitated the emergence of powerful actors who have developed parallel systems. These actors are increasingly capable of threatening the legacy international system.

Threats to U.S. national security interests today are complex, diverse, interconnected, and unpredictable. The Regional Security Network (RSN) concept combined with the Department of State’s goal of building a new global architecture will enable the U.S. government to compete successfully against its networked adversaries.³⁴ The following chapter describes the RSN method.

³³ Today’s non-state actors also frequently have global reach and, “rather than acting on orders from a remote HQ, criminal and terrorist networks are mostly entrepreneurial. They are best viewed as simply a range of actors responding to market forces or local political opportunities—acting semi-autonomously or autonomously.” Martin E. Dempsey, “The Bend of Power: How the U.S. military can overcome the challenges of complexity in a rapidly changing world,” <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/25/the-bend-of-power/> (accessed November 16, 2014).

³⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, (Washington DC: 2010), 19.

3. Let the Force be with You

In war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole, for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.¹ Clausewitz

The joint force faces three principal innovation challenges. First, it must remain capable of winning traditional interstate wars with near-peer and peer adversaries. Second, it must develop more effective methods to influence how its partners employ their capabilities to protect mutual interests against sophisticated and globally dispersed adversary networks conducting nonconventional warfare. Third, it must do all this despite budget uncertainties.

The Lykke strategy model is useful for demonstrating why the joint force must focus on developing new concepts versus simply acquiring additional resources for the new normal. Lykke uses a three-legged stool to represent his model. The stool's seat is the strategy, and its three legs consist of resources (means), concepts (ways), and objectives (ends). If the strategy does not align the three legs with each other, then the stool is at risk of tipping over (the strategy is at risk of failing). For example, if the joint force does not have sufficient resources (means) to execute its strategy, it must either gain more resources, develop new concepts, or adjust its objectives to align the three legs of the stool and reduce the risk of the strategy failing. It is unlikely the joint force will gain substantial resources in the current and projected budget environment. Out of necessity, the national security objectives will remain relatively consistent. The

¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 707.

only option remaining is for the joint force to focus on developing new concepts (ways) to align the legs of the stool and reduce the risk of the strategy failing.²

When viewing America's current approach to strategy through the lens of NW, it becomes clear that U.S. COIN doctrine as a concept has resulted in a misguided state-centric strategy for countering global networks. The U.S. response to the 9/11 attack by a non-state actor was invading Afghanistan, and then Iraq. Pursuing al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was necessary, but the U.S. attempted to transform a non-state network problem into a state-based problem. The logic goes something like this: If the U.S. could help (pick a failing state) fix their government, secure their borders, and win over the population within that state, the U.S. would defeat the threat. Unfortunately, recent history indicates that this theory is not reality in today's world.

Dominating geographic areas is an unsustainable approach that ultimately has little impact on a globally networked adversary. This is akin to putting one's hand in a bucket of water. The hand displaces the water around it until removed, then the water fills the vacuum again. While the U.S. defense establishment tied up thousands of troops and spent billions of dollars trying to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, al-Qaeda's network proliferated across the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and in many respects globally. Current U.S. COIN doctrine is a dysfunctional and expensive approach for defeating modern networked adversaries that operate across national borders. Instead the U.S. needs to embrace

² New concepts or ways can include changes in the operational approach, doctrine, organizations, or technology.

a concept analogous to regional and global Foreign Internal Defense (FID) for countering global networks now and in the near future.

The Regional Security Network (RSN)

It is increasingly clear that the joint force must innovate now to meet current and projected security challenges in the new normal. Uncertainty, rapid change that can cascade across borders, and growing complexity due to the multiplicity of interconnected and globally dispersed threat actors characterize the new normal. This necessitates that the joint force establishes RSNs networked across the globe with a wide range of partners that act proactively to mitigate the growing array of threats.

Jason Ramo, a national security consultant, developed the concept of “deep security.”³ He believes the U.S. will be unable to find enduring solutions for many of its security challenges, so instead of solving all of the underlying issues the U.S. will need to find ways to manage and mitigate the growing array of threats it faces. He likened his deep security concept to establishing a network that functions like an immune system, because an immune system is capable of sensing a problem and then developing an appropriate response to it.⁴ In the new normal, the Regional Security Network will serve as that system.

Since threats can emerge from almost any location in the world within a very short time span, the military must be increasingly flexible, adaptable, agile, and innovative in order to provide a range of feasible options to strategic level

³ Joshua Ramo, *The Age of the Unthinkable*, (New York: Little, Brown, 2007), 192.

⁴ Ibid.

decision makers.⁵ The joint force does not have sufficient force structure to do this alone, nor does it have all the requisite skills, area expertise, and influence required to shape the new normal environment. Just as the forces of globalization have forced the business world to adapt, the joint force must do the same to retain a competitive advantage over its adversaries. RSNs provide the GCCs a framework to facilitate adapting on a continuous basis in response to changes in the new normal.

The RSN concept builds upon and merges the ideas behind the *Globally Integrated Operations* concept, the *Global Special Operations Forces Network* (GSN),⁶ and the *Regional Engagement* concept developed by Special Forces Major General (Retired) Ken Bowra and Colonel William Harris.⁷ The Regional Engagement concept, like the RSN, is an operational concept for implementing the strategy of preventive defense. It focuses on military information gathering activities and proactive measures taken to influence conditions in a way that advances U.S. interests. Also like the RSN, its key points include its regional

⁵ For the purposes of this paper, “flexible” refers to the number of options the military can generate for decision makers to respond to a situation. “Adaptable” means the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the mission or environment. “Agility” means the ability to act quickly. “Innovative” means developing appropriate new ideas, methods, and/or technology to solve the problem.

⁶ Global SOF Network. All SOF, whether in home station or deployed in support of the GCCs, are part of the global SOF network. Networking allows SOF to exchange information and intelligence and collaborate globally, which is essential to counter transnational and transregional terrorists and other enemies and adversaries. The global SOF network includes nodes and other liaison elements to coordinate and synchronize special operations. The key organization in each GCC’s AOR is the TSOC. Note: nodes may include interagency partners, foreign partners, non-state actors, etc. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), III-2.

⁷ MG Ken Bowra and COL William Harris, “Regional Engagement an ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations,” *Special Warfare Magazine*, Vol 11, No 4. (Fall 1998): 3.

orientation and a proactive, versus reactive, focus. It is an appropriate strategy for NW.

The following description of the RSN avoids being prescriptive to encourage planners to tailor RSNs to fit their regions and missions. It provides broad considerations for RSN design. The RSN is an organizational and operational concept for taking shaping operations to the next level in the new normal. Part of the beauty of the RSN concept is that it is scalable and relatively amorphous with the exception of the standing RSN command and control structure.

What is the Regional Security Network?

The RSN, like other networks, consists of interconnected nodes that collaborate to achieve mutual objectives.⁸ Linkages (relationships) between nodes can be formal or informal, persistently maintained, or episodic and activated as needed. RSN designers should consider how the RSN can extend the GCC's operational reach, influence, situational awareness, and provide options for the joint force (or facilitate joint force enabled options) that are not otherwise available to assist in prioritizing where to establish RSN nodes.

There can be numerous types of nodes (different individuals, organizations, and the cyberspace structures required to facilitate networking across the region and globally), but to keep it simple this paper captures divides the nodes into two broad categories, “core nodes” and “non-core nodes.” This

⁸ JTFs are hierarchical networks normally established to accomplish a specific mission for a limited duration of time. In contrast, the RSN is less hierarchical and more persistent.

paper further subdivides core nodes into two categories. The first category of core nodes is the general category. The general category includes all organizations and individuals that are members under the operational control of the GCC. Examples include, the GCC staff, defense attaches, security cooperation officers, assigned forces, LNOs with the interagency, and deployed SOF elements. The second core node category is individuals specifically designated as RSN core nodes. Unlike the general core nodes previously mentioned, specifically designated RSN nodes do not have additional day jobs like Defense Attaches. Instead, they focus solely on their RSN assigned tasks. GCCs should give serious consideration to making SOF, cyber, and ISR core elements of their RSNs due to their unique capabilities to shape the environment.⁹ Non-core nodes are all the other nodes, and in many respects they are potentially the most powerful nodes in the RSN. Non-core nodes may include country teams, allied and partner nation security forces, NGOs, doctors, village elders, and members of civil society.

A key component of the RSN is the command and control structure (C2). While RSNs embrace the power of collaboration, the bottom line is GCCs must still maintain control of their core nodes in way that does not reduce their agility. Core nodes need the commander's intent to focus their efforts. They also need the ability to reach back for support. A JTF or JIATF like structure embedded within the GCC to operationalize shaping operations should be a serious consideration for RSN planners. The GCC would not think about conducting warfighting

⁹ SOF, Cyber, and ISR are low signature / small footprint capabilities that expand the GCC's combat power, increase its strategic flexibility and operational reach, increase responsiveness, and can provide a persistent presence, and operate independently without heavy logistics support. See *CCJO*, 7.

without the appropriate C2 structure, and shaping operations in the new normal need the same level of focus.


The power of the network approach is the ability to collaborate with its numerous nodes to leverage each node's unique authorities, core competencies, access, and degree of influence with targeted audiences to facilitate understanding and a multidiscipline approach to respond to shared challenges. Identifying those unique traits that each node brings to the effort and then leveraging them is a key to the success of the RSN concept. The nodes give the GCC a degree of forward edge presence, meaning they are closest to the problem whether in the field (operational) or close to the bureaucracy, if the problem is gaining consensus within the interagency. The more nodes in the RSN, the more options available to the GCC to shape the environment. This is the power of the network. As Brafman points out, “The *network effect* is the increase in the overall value of the network with the addition of each new member . . . each additional telephone makes all the other phones in the world more worthwhile.”¹⁰ Of course, it is more than numbers; it is the capabilities and influence the nodes bring to the network.

Russell Linden, an expert in interagency collaboration, argues, “The most significant challenges facing our society cannot be addressed by any one organization. They all require collaboration among many organizations.”¹¹ This is especially applicable for national security matters. A relatively small investment in resources to establish a RSN can serve as a powerful nontraditional force

¹⁰ Brafman and Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider*, 202.

¹¹ Russell Matthew Linden, *Leading across Boundaries: Creating Collaborative Agencies in a Networked World*, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 9.

multiplier for the GCCs. Figures 1 and 2¹² simplistically compare in broad terms how GCCs normally operate via a hub and spoke network (Fig 1), and a proposed RSN design (fig 2), which is a multidirectional network that facilitates continuous collaboration and the ability to rapidly gain understanding and effectively respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.



¹² The author produced figures 1 and 2.




Figure 2. An example of a Regional Security Network. It can facilitate understanding and develop a cross-functional regional and global joint force enabled responses for existing and emerging challenges and opportunities.

The Regional Security Network's Purpose

The RSN is designed to enable the joint force to operate in the new normal and counter an adversary's use of nonconventional warfare. Today's challenges demand that the joint force develop long term strategies and operational approaches that cross traditional boundaries between organizations and states. The RSN provides a scalable organizational framework and methodology that is rapidly adaptable to assist the joint force in meeting these challenges. It does this by facilitating rapid learning to enable tailored adaptive responses across boundaries.

The RSN can serve multiple purposes throughout the GCC's area of responsibility (AOR). There is no cookie-cutter design, rather its design is highly malleable so it can adapt to changing conditions and objectives. While not required, GCCs should consider developing RSN core nodes that focus on four key and mutually supporting tasks to facilitate the globally integrated operations concept.

1. Learning: Nodes should observe and interpret conditions, attitudes, and actions (situation awareness and understanding). Nodes will share these

observations across the network to facilitate learning and collaboration on a continuous basis.

2. Shaping: RSN nodes contribute to GCC shaping operations by identifying where to apply discrete military and non-military capabilities (e.g., rule of law, prison reform, disease control, water purification, or food security) and by collaborating with other nodes, especially nodes external to the U.S.

military to leverage their knowledge, capabilities, authorities, access, and influence. These activities support long term strategic and operational level objectives. GCCs develop shaping objectives that generally contribute to preventing crisis, achieving a position of decisive advantage over its adversaries, or otherwise shaping the environment to further U.S. interests.¹³ For example, if RSN nodes focus on enabling a whole of society approach to reduce or eliminate drivers of instability in a region, it will inhibit the ability of actors like al-Qaeda or TCNs to exploit these conditions to gain a foothold.

3. Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE): As a subset of shaping, RSN nodes conduct OPE to facilitate potential joint force responses.¹⁴ OPE tasks can vary from preparing the environment for warfighting, to supporting operations like disaster response, to facilitating very specific missions such as find, fix, and finish missions to neutralize selected targets.

4. Crisis Response: If prevention fails and a crisis emerges, the RSN will assist the GCC in developing a joint force response, and/or assist a partner in responding. If a RSN node includes SOF, then SOF with supporting ISR, and in some cases offensive cyber capabilities, can potentially resolve the crisis without deploying additional forces. If the crisis requires a larger joint force response, besides providing OPE information, the RSN will leverage its network nodes to assist the joint force response element with their mission.

¹³ Bowra and Harris. “Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations,” 3. Regional engagement is a military operational concept for implementing the strategy of preventive defense. Bowra and Harris define regional engagement as regionally oriented military information-gathering activities and proactive measures taken to influence international conditions in such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.

¹⁴ Defined in the DOD dictionary as the conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Also called OPE.

While RSN core-members can accomplish much on their own, the real value of the RSN is to extend the GCC's operational reach to shape the new normal using the power of the network as a force multiplier and to synergize collaborative action. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of the RSN is to connect and establish relationships with a wide range of actors to facilitate collaboration with the goal of facilitating unified action to achieve the GCC's objectives. The core-nodes will have a limited span of directive control, but potentially can create cascading success across physical and cultural boundaries using collaboration and influence. See figure 3.




Figure 3 Notional spheres of RSN influence. Ellipse 1 represents the sphere of direct control; Ellipse 2 represents the expanded sphere of influence via collaboration with partner; and Ellipse 3 represents the potential sphere of cascading success across multiple boundaries.

Command and Control (C2) Structure for RSNs

This may be the most important element in the entire concept. On the one hand, if the RSN is overly constrained by its C2 system it will not be effective. On the other hand, if there is insufficient C2 structure the RSN will over time simply become a collection of nodes operating independently that do not support the GCC's priorities. Finding the balance between excessive control and insufficient

control to facilitate maximizing the RSN's output will require constant learning and adjustment.

The core nodes need considerable freedom of action; therefore, the concept of mission command is essential to the ability of the RSN to function.¹⁵ The GCC must ensure that non-core nodes recognize the RSN's core nodes as representatives entrusted and empowered to speak and act on behalf of the GCC. Core nodes must be entrepreneurial and allowed to take calculated risks. RSN planners must consider choosing the right people to fill RSN positions as an essential task. Additionally, planners should designate elements of the GCC staff to support RSN nodes. These GCC staff members serve as a reach back capability that keeps the command informed of their activities, requests support from experts as needed on the GCC staff, and provides various forms of other support to the RSN nodes as required. In short, they serve as action officers for the forward nodes to help set conditions for their success. This will help the core nodes be proactive and move at the speed of the challenge or opportunity.

The RSN must be adaptable so it can adjust rapidly to ground truth at the forward edge of the network. The core nodes will have limited to no directive authority over non-core nodes in their networks. Instead they must rely on their ability to build relationships based on trust so they can accomplish objectives with others through the process of collaboration.¹⁶ That means non-core nodes must perceive core nodes as credible. Core nodes need the authority to make decisions

¹⁵ Mission command maximizes the human element in joint operations by emphasizing trust, force of will, intuitive judgment, and creativity. It is the ethic of decentralization. See the *CCJO*, 4.

¹⁶ The definition of "collaboration" is two or more entities working together on a common project. The *CCJO* states the future of mission command will be highly collaborative, *CCJO*, 5.

at their level to the extent possible. The RSN nodes will need funding that is flexible enough to facilitate their mission (within limits). The ability to use money and employ manpower gives the core RSN nodes the ability to shape the network and the environment and more effectively to accomplish GCC objectives. Finally, to the extent possible the GCC needs to facilitate the education of its core RSN members in the languages and cultures in their region.

Summary

In the new normal, Regional Security Networks will provide a proactive forward presence to facilitate integrated, holistic, and nuanced approaches to shape the environment and manage the full spectrum of threats the U.S. will face in the 21st century. The RSN is an innovative proposal to assist the joint force in adapting to and effectively influencing the ever accelerating rate of change in the environment. As the QDDR states, in the new normal,

In an interconnected world, cascading changes can and will amplify the significance of a small initial event. Brief windows of opportunity will arise [to act]. New challenges will unfold faster than any system can respond. . . . We must be fast acting, innovative and flexible, and we must tailor our responses to the complex, rapidly evolving environments in which we operate.¹⁷

The RSN provides the GCCs with a persistent and adaptable network empowered to act within its authorities at the speed of the challenge. As the QDDR stated, no system can move at the speed new challenges will unfold. The RSN is not a system, but a fluid network that enables the GCCs to adapt as fast they learn. It is a 21st century operational approach to counter or wage

¹⁷ QDDR, 24.

nonconventional warfare and defend the U.S. from other threats.

4. Conclusion

The illiterate of the future are not those that cannot read and write. They are those that cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn. Alvin Toffler (futurist)

One key to understanding the future security environment is to understand the impact of globalization. The forces of globalization continue to unravel the international order that the U.S. has relied upon for its security and prosperity, and yet knowing this the U.S. has failed to adapt to meet this challenge. U.S. national security processes and military doctrine (the foundation of everything else in the military) must adapt rapidly to effectively meet the challenge of the multiplicity of interconnected threats dispersed around the globe waging nonconventional warfare is the new normal.

This paper argues that shaping operations in the new normal are as strategically important as winning traditional interstate wars, and that the joint force cannot hope to align against the expanding diversity of globally dispersed threats unless it embraces the power of human networks. The RSN is a method that will enable the GCCs to align against dispersed threats, conduct shaping operations in the new normal, enable the joint force to counter nonconventional warfare (NW), and respond to crises. Recently, General Dempsey wrote, “The challenge for joint force 2020 will be to create more diverse and responsive capabilities with fewer resources.”¹ The Regional Security Network is one way to do so inside a no-growth budget.

The RSN leverages the power of collaboration with its nodes to bring a wide range of capabilities to bear on the challenges at hand. It can achieve objectives in a

¹ Martin Dempsey, "The Future of Joint Operations," *Foreign Affairs*, 23 Nov 2014, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139524/martin-e-dempsey/the-future-of-joint-operations>>. Accessed 11/22/2014.

number of ways that traditional military approaches alone cannot. Theoretically, just as al-Qaeda has used the forces of globalization to create cascading destabilization in regions, the RSN can create cascading successes. However, RSNs cannot provide the exponential power increase possible unless they are empowered with mission command and manned with the right people.

After a fitful start consisting of stove-piped efforts that often were at cross purposes, the military and many interagency partners have learned, or relearned, the importance of mutual supporting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These same lessons apply to the new normal. Working with country teams is essential, but insufficient. It is imperative that the joint force build networks that span borders and address challenges regionally and globally.

Although states will remain the most powerful entities politically, economically, and militarily, their relative power advantage continues to fade. Moreover, the current power advantage states enjoy means little if they are unwilling to wield their power in new and subtle ways to shape an international order that will promote global security and prosperity. The consequences of not doing so will not result in the demise of the U.S., but instead the nation's economy and global influence will gradually weaken over time. This loss of global influence will result in ever greater threats from a wider range of actors around the globe. The bottom line is if the U.S. government chooses to act with a sense of urgency to modernize its national security processes to align them with 21st century challenges, then the U.S. will remain a global leader capable of shaping the international system in ways that benefit continued national prosperity and security.

Numerous areas require more research to develop the ideas in this paper further. First, how can joint doctrine more effectively capture the reality of nonconventional warfare and other challenges in the new normal? Second, what authorities do the GCCs need to enable them to move at the speed of the challenge, while still facilitating appropriate civilian oversight? Third, despite the ability of the joint force to dominate the physical domains, they have not had success in dominating the key terrain in the new normal and nonconventional war, which is the human terrain. It is worth further study to see if the joint force should adapt into doctrine the idea of either a human or cognitive domain. Finally, how does the joint force change its culture so it promotes, instead of inhibits, entrepreneurial thinking and appropriate risk taking?

All of these actions will support and enhance the development and implementation of Regional Security Networks. This paper is but a start—albeit a necessary one—to move U.S. military thinking from the stable structures of the old world into a place where it is flexible and adaptive enough to conform to exigencies of the new normal world in the 21st century.

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